Ralph Cudworth (1617–88) was an intellectual leader of the philosophical school known as Cambridge Platonism, a group of University of Cambridge theologians and Platonist philosophers who were influential during the 17th century. In The True Intellectual System of the Universe, Cudworth describes various atheistic arguments in detail before attempting to refute them in the final chapter of the book. In the selection below, Cudworth presents several arguments in response to the atheistic assertion that the problem of evil renders belief in God unreasonable, including the following: “Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind, they having no standing measure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in.”
Excerpt:
Having quite routed and vanquished the Atheists’ main body, we shall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and scattered forces, viz. Their objections against Providence, their queries, and their arguments from interest, with a breath or two. Their first objection is against Providence, as to the fabric of the world, from the faultiness of the mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; “Quia tanta stat praedita culpa” [Lucretius]; That because it is so ill-made, —therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted, that whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does therefore ipso facto suppose all things to be well made, and as they should be. And this doubtless was the case of all the ancient Theologers, however some modern Theists deviate therefore; these concluding the perfection or the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such a have a superior over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures: but the prerogative of a being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely indifferent to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself. And this is supposed by them to be the liberty, sovereignty and dominion of the Deity: Wherefore such Theists as these would think themselves altogether unconcerned in these atheistic objections against Providence, or in defending the fabric of the world, as faultless, they being as ready as the Atheists themselves, to acknowledge, that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it must be said to be well, because so made, but pretending nevertheless, that this is no impeachment at all of the existence of a God, “Quia Deus non tenetur ad optimum,” because God is no way bound or obliged to the best; —he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do these Theists else, than whilst they deny the fortuitous motion of senseless matter to be the first original of all things, themselves in the mean time enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controversy betwixt the Atheists and these Theists seems to be no other than this, whether senseless matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, such as is altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, to be the sovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly we mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope, in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senseless atoms furiously agitated, or of a rapid whirlwind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it should be more desirable to be under the empire of senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, armed with omnipotence; because the former could harbor no hurtful or mischievous designs against any, as the latter might. But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, is so far from being the highest liberty, sovereignty, and dominion, the greatest perfection, and the divinest thing of all, that it is indeed nothing else but weakness and impotency itself, or brutish folly and madness. And therefore those ancients, who affirmed, that Mind was Lord over all, and the supreme King of heaven and earth, held at the same time, that God was the sovereign monarch of the universe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, because Mind is that, which orders all things for the sake of the Good; and whatsoever doth otherwise, was, according to them, … not Mens but Dementia, and consequently no god…. [As Origen says,] We Christians (who hold the resurrection) say as well as you, that God can do nothing, which is in itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any evil, he is no God. —And again, … “God willeth nothing unbecoming himself, or what is truly indecorous; forasmuch as this is inconsistent with his Godship.” —And to the same purpose Plotinus, … “The Deity acteth according to its own nature and essence; and its nature and essence displayeth goodness and justice: for if these things be not there, where should they else be found?” [Ennead III.2.13] —And again, elsewhere, … “God is essentially that, which ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be such as he is: and this first ought to be is the principle of all things whatsoever, that ought to be.” [Ennead VI.8.9] —Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived, as mere arbitrariness, humour, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance), but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodness, justice, and wisdom; or decorousness, fitness, and ought itself, willing; so that … that, which is absolutely the best, is … an indispensable law to it, because its very essence. —God is … an impartial balance, —lying even, equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things herein, in the most just and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of servility (as men fondly imagine this to be contrary to his liberty), much less by the law and command of any superiour (which is a contradiction), but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheist’s argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well made, and as they should be; et vice versa. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove, that either the whole system of the world could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.
There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superiour and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination but slowly discovering the intrigues and connivances of Providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatic vessels, and other things (without which the mechanical structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood), all but so lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use, that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly made….
In the next place, the Atheist supposes, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man, he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this seemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some straight-laced Stoics, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by their own self-love, their over-weaning and puffy conceit of themselves. And so fleas and lice, had they understanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men also, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole for the Maker thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well said to have been made principally (though not only) for man. For we ought not to monopolize the Divine goodness to ourselves, there being other animals superiour to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable to think, that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made partly also, to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind, they having no standing measure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in. That was at first but a froward speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves, by railing upon nature (that is, Providence), and calling her a stepmother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals; and though this be elegantly set off by Lucretius [de rerum natura V.223], yet there is nothing but poetic flourish in it all, without any philosophical truth; the advantages of mankind being so notoriously conspicuous above those of brutes.
But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheist would conclude the God of the Theist to be either impotent or envious; it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the necessity of imperfect beings, and the incompossibility of things; but that the Divine art and skill most of all appeareth in bonifying these evils, and making them, like discords in music, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular persons.
Moreover, a great part of those evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own fancy and opinions, according to that of the moralist… “It is not things themselves, that disturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things” [Epictetus, Encheiridion 5]—And therefore it being much in our power to be freed from these, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them….
Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 4 vols. (London: Richard Priestley, 1820), IV. 159-67.