Karl Barth was preoccupied with the question of theodicy, probably more so than is readily apparent in his works. Among other things, his concern shows in the fact that he dedicated a highly idiosyncratic treatise to the problem of evil that deviates significantly from the theological tradition and is still worth contemplating today. The treatise in question, of course, is the much-discussed and controversial §50 in Church Dogmatics III/3, titled “God and Nothingness” (“Gott und das Nichtige”), in which he develops his ‘doctrine’ of das Nichtige, of evil in a wider sense. The fact that this doctrine considerably deviates from both classical and modern theodicy attempts is already apparent in the term of ‘das Nichtige’. For German-speaking contemporaries of Barth and current readers alike, this term is a semantic irritation. It is not exactly a neologism: the term and related variations can already be found in the writings of Martin Luther, but also in those of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the philosophers of German idealism, Friedrich Nietzsche, Rudolf Otto, and others. For Barth, the works of Arthur Schopenhauer, Wilhelm Herrmann and Martin Heidegger probably were the most significant points of reference. But while Barth, in this sense, appropriates a marginal term of existing philosophical-theological language, he gives the term a new direction of meaning and an entirely unprecedented weightiness. Before Barth, nobody had understood the term das Nichtige in the sense of such a destructive, aggressive, dark force. Therefore, it is inappropriate and misleading to simply translate the term as ‘nothingness’. Indeed, Barth not only rejected but actively tried to overcome the proximity to mnemonic traditions of philosophy and to the concept of privation in the Augustinian tradition that is suggested by this translation. In contrast, the term ‘das Nichtige’ serves to mark the blank spaces that have evolved in the talk of evil in modern times. It disrupts our linguistic habits and shows how abysmally horrible experiences, such as those made in the two world wars, resist terminological containment. And in this way, it indicates that evil is a mystery that precedes and transcends all thought.
Matthias D. Wüthrich, “An Entirely Different ‘Theodicy’: Karl Barth’s Interpretation of Human Suffering in the Context of his Doctrine of das Nichtige.” International Journal of Systematic Theology, 66/2 (2017), 55–80.
Excerpts from “God and Nothingness”
The Problem of Nothingness
There is opposition and resistance to God’s world-dominion. There is in world-occurrence an element, indeed an entire sinister system of elements, which is not comprehended by God’s providence…, and which is not therefore preserved, accompanied, nor ruled by the almighty action of God like creaturely occurrence. It is an element to which God denies the benefit of His preservation, concurrence and rule, of His fatherly lordship and which is itself opposed to being preserved, accompanied and ruled in any sense, fatherly or otherwise. There is amongst the objects of God’s providence an alien factor. It cannot escape God’s providence but is comprehended by it. The manner, however, in which this is done is highly peculiar… It is distinct from that in which God’s providence rules the creature and creaturely occurrence. The result is that the alien factor can never be considered or mentioned together in the same context as other objects of God’s providence. Thus the whole doctrine of God’s providence must be investigated afresh. This opposition and resistance, this stubborn element and alien factor may be provisionally defined as nothingness….
It would be comparatively easy to understand and state the doctrine of God’s providence if it involved no more than the relationship between the lordship of God and creaturely occurrence as such… There would be no difficulty if only creaturely occurrence, though ruled by God, did not also stand under the determination of this alien factor, of nothingness. There would be no difficulty if only a careful consideration of this factor which also determines creaturely activity were not absolutely unavoidable if the doctrine of God’s providence is not to ignore its most urgent question and to desist from giving its most important answer. Perpendicular lines from above can render it in some measure intelligible and clear, as we have already demonstrated, what takes place between God the Creator and the creature as God’s royal dominion on the one side, and creaturely existence, life and occurrence under this dominion on the other. “Of him and through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen” (Rom. 11:36)… With regard to the good Creator and Lord, and the creature created good by Him, it could indeed be developed in straight (or apparently straight) lines. The truth of this scriptural saying must stand. Yet what does “of him, through him, and to him” mean in view of the fact that “all things,” i.e., man first, but through him and for him all things, are also affected by nothingness, being enmeshed in and bound up with it, sharing its nature, bearing its marks, and in some degree, directly or indirectly, actively or passively, overtly or covertly, being involved in the existence and operation of this alien factor?… Does not even the best which emerges from God’s Word concerning His lordship over the creature remain unsaid if it is not also stated from the particular standpoint that it also belongs to the existence of life and activity of the creature to be involved in nothingness, and always to be partly determined by it in its present form?…
In this instance, however, we do not make any advance by drawing straight lines from above, i.e., by thinking and speaking in direct statements concerning the action of the Creator on and with His creature… [T]he peculiar factor now to be considered is that between the Creator and the creature, or more exactly the creaturely sphere under the lordship of the Creator, there is that at work which can be explained neither from the side of the Creator nor from that of the creature, neither as the action of the Creator nor as the life-act of the creature, and yet which cannot be overlooked or disowned but must be reckoned with in all its peculiarity. The simple recognition that God is Lord over all must obviously be applied to this third factor as well. Where would be the real situation of the real man or the real way of real trust of the real Christian, where would be the decisive truth and power of the doctrine of God’s providence, if the knowledge that He is Lord over all were not applied especially to this element? But if God’s lordship is applicable here too, how are we to avoid error on the one side or the other? We stray on the one side if we argue that this element of nothingness derives from the positive will and work of God as if it too were a creature, and that the Creator Himself and His lordship are responsible for its nothingness, the creature being exonerated from all responsibility for its existence, presence and activity. But we go astray on the other side if we maintain that it derives solely from the activity of the creature, in relation to which the lordship of God can only be a passive permission and observation, an ineffectual foreknowledge and a subsequent attitude. In the one case, the obvious error is to misinterpret the fact that God is Lord, to fail to understand that for that reason His lordship cannot be affected by nothingness. In the other case, the error is to misinterpret the meaning of lordship, namely, that God rules in sublime and unlimited majesty over every sphere, and therefore over that of nothingness as well. But how is it possible to avoid the one error without falling into the other? How can justice be done both to the holiness and to the omnipotence of God when we are faced by the problem of nothingness? How can the simple recognition that God is Lord over all be applied to this sphere?…
Yet it is also possible to go astray here in an entirely different manner. For it is clearly wrong to apply the basic recognition of God’s lordship in such a way that nothingness in its relation of opposition and resistance to God’s world-dominion assumes the form of a monster which, vested with demonic qualities, inspires fear and respect instead of awakening the Easter joy that even in all its power as sin and evil it is no more than the nothingness which as such is already judged in Jesus Christ and can therefore injure but no longer kill or destroy. Again, it is no less clearly wrong if this victorious might of faith is treated as if it were a principle at our own disposal, or if it is forgotten that the victory over nothingness can be ours only through hope in Jesus Christ, or if we think and speak of this adversary, who was certainly not defeated by us, in any other way than in the fear of God and the seriousness of faith. We describe the same dilemma when we say that in considering the manner in which God disposes even of nothingness, letting it have its course and yet overruling it for good, there is the danger either of an uneasy, bleak and skeptical overestimating of its power in relation to God, or of an easy, comfortable and dogmatic underestimation of its power in relation to us. How are we to avoid both an easy pessimism on the one side and a no less easy optimism on the other? How are we to think and speak of God’s lordship even over nothingness with the necessary confidence and yet also the required humility, the required humility and yet also the necessary confidence?…
It may be said at least that it can be so only as we soberly acknowledge that we have here an extraordinarily clear demonstration of the necessary brokenness of all theological thought and utterance. There is no theological sphere where this is not noticeable. All theology is theologia viatorm. It can never satisfy the natural aspiration of human thought and utterance for completeness and compactness. It does not exhibit its object but can only indicate it, and in so doing it owes the truth to the self-witness of the theme and not to its own resources. It is broken thought and utterance to the extent that it can progress only in isolated thoughts and statements directed from different angles to the one object. It can never form a system, comprehending and as it were “seizing” the object. That is true of all theological assertions. It is true even of the perpendicular lines from above in which we have developed the general doctrine of God’s providence with regard to the relationship between the good Creator and His good creature. But if we failed to see this there and elsewhere, here at last we must surely see and acknowledge that our knowledge is piece-work, and that only as such can it stand and make sense in relation to its theme. But why is this true here, and therefore universally? The reason is obvious. The existence, presence and operation of nothingness, which we are here concerned to discuss, are also objectively the break in the relationship between Creator and creature. The existence, presence, and operation of nothingness are not only the frontier which belongs to the nature of this relationship on both sides and which is grounded in the goodness of the Creator and that of the Creature. They are also the break which runs counter to the nature of this relationship, which is compatible with neither the goodness of the Creator nor that of the creature and which cannot be derived from either side but can only be regarded as hostility in relation to both. We are not now dealing with the break itself, but with God’s relation to it, with His providence and the extent to which it comprehends this break as well. In this context, however, this break is our particular concern. For theology as a human activity, and under the presuppositions of the present dispensation knows its object solely under the shadow of this break. Objectively, it must always receive it from beyond this break. Hence it cannot even be aware of its object without also being aware of this break. And this means that theological thought and utterance must always be broken. Not even objectively is the relationship between Creator and creature a system. It is always disrupted by this alien element. Hence there can be no system in the subjective knowledge of this relationship, and therefore in theology. Does not this emerge with particular clarity when we have to deal specifically with God’s providence in its relation to the nothingness with which His creature is involved? Here if anywhere it is imperative that theology, which is also a creaturely activity should acknowledge that it is bound up with nothingness, and cannot and must not try to escape it. Here if anywhere theology as the subjective reproduction of objective reality ought not to impose or simulate a system. Here especially theology must set an example for its procedure generally, corresponding to its object in broken thoughts and utterance…
This does not mean, of course, that we ought not to proceed here and everywhere with the greatest intellectual probity and with rigorous logic and objectivity. Here however—and not only here, but here with particular urgency by reason of the particular aspect of the theological object—the meaning of objectivity is that we must be prepared simply and without diminution to accept and take into account, each in its own place and manner, all the conflicting claims: the claim that God’s holiness and omnipotence should be equally respected; the claim that we should think and speak of this matter with joy and also with seriousness; the claim that the power of nothingness should be rated as low as possible in relation to God and as high as possible in relation to ourselves. If we do this, it does not mean that we shall be led to a system nor to the complete and compact sequence of thoughts and statements yielded by a principle. On the contrary, the break itself and as such will be reproduced and reflected in our knowledge and its presentation; and not only the break, but in, with and above it the history in which it is after all—for God is Lord—no more than an alien, disruptive and retarding moment—the history of the Creator’s dealings with His creature, of the doing of His will as it was in His counsel and as it will finally be fulfilled. This history, in the course of which this break occurs, is the object of theology. Theology is the record of this history. Hence it must consider all those claims in their place and manner. It must not be intent on unifications or mediations which are not to be found in the history. It must not degenerate into a system. It must always be related to that history. It must always be a report. It must not strain after completeness and compactness. Its aim must simply be to make the right report. This is the general and formal answer to the question how the simple recognition of God’s universal lordship is rightly to be applied in view of the presence of nothingness as opposition and resistance to that lordship…
The Misconception of Nothingness
…It is true that in creation there is not only a Yes but also a No; not only a height but also an abyss; not only clarity but also obscurity; not only progress and continuation but also impediment and limitation; not only growth but also decay; not only opulence but also indigence; not only beauty but also ashes; not only beginning but also end; not only value but also worthlessness. It is true that in creaturely existence, and especially in the existence of man, there are hours, days and years both bright and dark, both success and failure, laughter and tears, youth and age, gain and loss, birth and sooner or later its inevitable corollary, death. It is true that individual creatures and men experience these things in most unequal measure, their lots being assigned by a justice which is curious or very much concealed. Yet it is irrefutable that creation and creature are good even in the fact that all that is exists in this contrast and antithesis. In all this, far from being null, it praises its Creator and Lord even on its shadowy side, even in the negative aspect in which it is so near to nothingness. If He Himself has comprehended creation in its totality and made it His own in His Son, it is for us to acquiesce without thinking that we know better, without complaints, reproach or dismay. For all that we can tell, may not His creatures praise Him more mightily in humility than in exaltation, in need than in plenty, in fear than in joy, on the frontier of nothingness than when wholly oriented on God?… [If] there may also be praise of God from the abyss, the night and misfortune, and perhaps even from the darkest abyss, the darkest night and the greatest misfortune, why should we doubt the hidden justice which apportions the distinctions and contrasts to ourselves and others?… We aspire to be Christians, and no doubt in some small measure we are, but is it not strange that only in our few better moments can we make anything either theoretically or practically of the truth that the creation of God in both its aspects, even the negative, is His good creation?
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics Ill/3, § 50.1-2; trans. G. W. Bromily and R. J. Ehrlich (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 1960), 289-97.